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[The mind-brain problem (I): onto-epistemological foundations].

Abstract：

INTRODUCTION:Throughout the history of thought, science and philosophy have addressed the problem of mind-brain from different epistemic perspectives. The first covers specific areas of reality and constructs hypotheses with limited scope and multiple inter-scientific connectivity with the aim of validating theoretical models; the second extends its systemic architecture to all that is real (including scientific activity). DEVELOPMENT:The complexity of the mind-brain problem requires the generation of a link connecting the disciplines of philosophy and science; our onto-epistemological presuppositions therefore fall within the framework of a scientifically-oriented philosophy (scientific philosophy). Emergentist materialism is defended as a coherent and verifiable philosophical-scientific solution, as opposed to other proposals developed on the basis of different ontological models (for example, interactionist dualism, functionalism, theory of identity, epiphenomenalism, and so on). CONCLUSIONS:An answer to the mind-brain problem is only feasible if based on a philosophically grounded cognitive neuroscience: emergentist materialism -an ontological postulate- holds that the mind is an emergent property (qualitative novelty) of the brain; scientific realism -an epistemological postulate- holds that cognitive neuroscience is the basic theoretical-experimental tool that allows cognitive access to both the brain and its neurocognitive processes. We consider that on the basis of this philosophical reasoning, cognitive neuroscience acquires epistemic legitimacy to be able to undertake the study of the most genuinely human mental process: consciousness. TITLE:El problema mente-cerebro (I): fundamentos ontoepistemologicos. :Introduccion. La ciencia y la filosofia han abordado a lo largo de la historia del pensamiento y desde diferentes perspectivas epistemicas el problema mente-cerebro. La primera de ellas acota areas especificas de la realidad y construye hipotesis de corto alcance y multiple conectividad intercientifica con el objetivo de validar modelos teoricos; la segunda extiende su arquitectura sistemica al conjunto de lo real (incluida la actividad cientifica). Desarrollo. La complejidad del problema mente-cerebro exige generar un vinculo de conexion disciplinar entre la filosofia y la ciencia; nuestros presupuestos ontoepistemologicos se erigen, por lo tanto, en el marco de una filosofia orientada cientificamente (filosofia cientifica). Se defiende el materialismo emergentista como solucion filosofico-cientifica coherente y contrastable en contraposicion a otras propuestas desarrolladas desde diferentes modelos ontologicos (por ejemplo, dualismo interaccionista, funcionalismo, teoria de la identidad, epifenomenalismo...). Conclusiones. La respuesta al problema mente-cerebro solo es factible desde una neurociencia cognitiva fundamentada filosoficamente: el materialismo emergentista –postulado ontologico– afirma que la mente es una propiedad emergente (novedad cualitativa) del cerebro; el realismo cientifico –postulado epistemologico– sostiene que la neurociencia cognitiva es la herramienta teorico-experimental basica que posibilita el acceso cognoscitivo tanto al cerebro como a sus procesos neurocognitivos. Consideramos que a partir de esta fundamentacion filosofica, la neurociencia cognitiva adquiere legitimidad epistemica para acometer el estudio del proceso mental mas genuinamente humano: la conciencia.

journal_name

Rev Neurol

journal_title

Revista de neurologia

authors

Goni-Saez F,Tirapu-Ustarroz J

subject

Has Abstract

pub_date

2016-08-01 00:00:00

pages

130-9

issue

eissn

0210-0010

issn

1576-6578

pii

rn2016230

journal_volume

pub_type

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[The mind-brain problem (I): onto-epistemological foundations].